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The Bush-Obama Stimulus Programs
and the Future of American
Capitalism
Dr. Randall Holcombe*

ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the implications of the measures that the U.S.
Federal Government has taken in response to the recent financial crisis. It
focuses on the Federal Reserve, the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the
Obama stimulus package, and the bailouts of various industries by the
Federal Government. This paper argues that these policies undermine the
fundamental incentives of the market economy, but what we can learn from
these policies to avoid similar negative consequences in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is the impact of the Bush and Obama stimulus programs on the
future of American capitalism? To adequately address this question, one
must consider the nature of American capitalism, how it has produced the
great prosperity that we have, what underlies the foundation of American
capitalism, and how some of the policies of the past two years threaten those
foundations.
Think about the remarkable economic progress that we have achieved—
our standard of living, driving around in our automobiles, flying in planes,
using cell phones, the iPod, and the Internet. The worldwide web only
started in the early 1990s. This remarkable economic progress started with
the industrial revolution in 1760, with developments beginning in Britain,
and spreading to the rest of the world.1 One can see the sluggish
advancement of standards of living for previous generations by examining
their lifestyle, food, methods of production, and consumer goods. Economic
progress was so slow that people would not have noticed it in their lifetimes.
Life in 1750 was not that different from life in 1650. Likewise, life in 1650
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was not that different from life in 1550 and life in 1550 was not that
different from life in 550.
There were about a thousand years of remarkable advances in
civilization. Ancient Rome and China had incredible advances in their
civilization. However, by about 550 A.D. that economic progress essentially
slowed to a crawl and virtually stopped. Essentially, someone who slept in
550 and woke up in 1550 would not see that much difference in how people
lived, how they consumed goods, and how they produced those goods.
After the industrial revolution, remarkable economic progress began and
is still going on today. Profits and losses in a market economy created the
foundation of this economic progress. Profits give people an incentive to
look for ways to be productive and to help other people, so entrepreneurs
and innovators look for innovations that they can introduce into the
economy. Profits play several closely related roles in an economy. Think
about our economic well-being, if somebody takes resources and combines
those resources into output, and the value of the output is greater than the
value of the resources used to produce the input. Increased value benefits all
by increasing value in the economy.
We should reward people who take less valuable inputs and turn them
into output that is more valuable. In fact, the market economy does that.
That is the role of profit. If somebody takes resources that have a certain
value and they combine them into output that is worth less than the value of
resources that they started with, they are reducing value in the economy. We
should penalize people who do that. Losses penalize people who allocate
resources inefficiently. Conversely, profits reward people who allocate
resources efficiently. Those profits and losses provide incentives in an
economy for entrepreneurial individuals who are looking for innovations if
they can come up with innovations to increase value in an economy. That
profit acts as a lure to give innovators an incentive to be innovative and
entrepreneurial.
At the same time, that profit gives people an incentive to take risks, the
possibility of losses also gives them an incentive to be prudent in the risks
that they take, so that they do not take excessive risks. Profits and losses are
a necessary foundation for the operation of the market economy for this
remarkable economic progress that we have had over the past 250 years.
That is not that long in the history of mankind. This is something relatively
recent and is on-going that people tend to take for granted. If we look at the
policies that resulted in the economic downturn of the past year and a half, a
number of cases depict economic policies that undermine the fundamental
role of profits and losses in the economy.
People talk about the health care reform bill, which is in the forefront of
public discussion. People are concerned about the huge budget deficits that
the Obama Administration is forecasting. This is not a partisan critique
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because many of these policies began under the Bush Administration. The
Bush-Obama policies are a bipartisan effort to undermine the fundamental
incentives of our market economy. There are four areas related to the
policy. First, there is the role of the Federal Reserve. Second, there is the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Third, is the Obama stimulus
package, and the fourth concern is the bailouts.
II. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
The Federal Reserve was set up to be a bank for member banks.
Members of the Federal Reserve System borrow from the Federal Reserve
through the discount window. The Federal Reserve was established for the
sole purpose of making loans to member banks. Over the years, the Federal
Reserve’s role has evolved. Now, one of the most important functions of the
Federal Reserve is to control the size of the money supply through open
market operation. Open market operation is the buying and selling of
Federal Government securities.
Over the past year and a half, under Chairman Bernanke, Federal
Reserve policy has changed substantially. This was a bipartisan effort.
These things began during the Bush Administration when Ben Bernanke was
appointed chairman of the Federal Reserve by President Bush. Of course,
one of the major events that we saw in September 2008 was the Federal
Reserve bailing out AIG. It is without precedent that the Federal Reserve
would spend $85 billion to bail out American International Group (AIG) as
it was on the verge of collapse. Later, the treasury used TARP money to
take over AIG with the Federal Reserve, but the Federal Reserve has never
bailed out private companies like this.2 It is unparalleled that a company
taking losses and about to go bankrupt was rescued by the Federal Reserve.
The Federal Reserve has started making loans to financial institutions
that are not member banks or members of the Federal Reserve System. In
fact, they are not even banks. The Federal Reserve began making loans to
investment banks and other financial institutions. This is new and
unprecedented in Federal Reserve history.
A third action taken by the Federal Reserve was to purchase securities
that are not issued by the Federal Government. It now owns and has on its
balance sheets securities that it bought from financial firms that are not
banks. The Federal Reserve is not sharing information about the securities
that it is holding. In 2009, Bloomberg News sued the Federal Reserve under
the Freedom of Information Act claiming that they have a right to get the
information about what assets the Federal Reserve has purchased and what
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assets it is holding. As of now, the Federal Reserve has not divulged this
information and it is under dispute as to whether that ought to be public
information.
Again, it is unprecedented for the Federal Reserve to be buying financial
assets from banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System, and
financial institutions that are not even banks. Before the financial crisis, it
could be fairly said that the Federal Reserve, while it controlled the money
supply and had much to do with regulating banking, was neutral in the way
that it operated in the economy and that most firms were treated the same
way under objective rules. Now, the Federal Reserve has decided it is going
to step in, rescue some firms, and buy financial assets from other firms.
Essentially, the Federal Reserve is engaging in an industrial policy
similar to what the Japanese government has been doing for the past halfcentury. During the 1980s, Japanese industrial policy was heralded as a
great way for government to manage economic growth in a high growth
economy. Many believed that the reason for Japan’s high growth rate was
that the Japanese government was getting actively involved in picking
preeminent firms in the economy, then helping and supporting those firms.
Many in the United States believed that the U.S. should emulate Japanese
industrial policy to raise the U.S. growth rate.3 However, since the early
1990s, the Japanese economy has stagnated, and few still mention the virtues
of Japanese industrial policy.
Yet, what the Federal Reserve is doing now is moving exactly in that
direction. The Federal Reserve is managing industrial policy in the United
States. This is troubling because in helping some firms and choosing not to
help other firms, the government is picking winners and losers in the
economy, which is undermining the fundamental role of profits and losses in
an economy.4 Former Treasury Secretary Paulson worked for GoldmanSachs, so it is probably no coincidence that Goldman-Sachs is one of the
former investment banks still thriving.5 Other investment banks like Bear
Stearns and Merrill Lynch were acquired, and still others like Lehman
Brothers failed.6 This is because the Federal Reserve, with assistance from
the Treasury, was supporting some firms, but not supporting other firms,
which sets a very dangerous precedent.
III. THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM
The second item of importance is TARP. In late September 2008,
Secretary Paulson concluded that the financial system was in a significant
amount of trouble. Inter-bank lending had nearly frozen up and financial
markets were following suit. The problem, according to Secretary Paulson,
was that banks were holding on to certain toxic assets such as mortgage-
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backed securities that were difficult to value. One might make a loan to a
firm that ended up going under next week because of problems with its
assets.7
Secretary Paulson’s solution was the establishment of TARP, which was
intended to use $700 billion to buy up those troubled assets. The
government would then be holding the toxic assets under TARP, and the
banks would get money from the Treasury. The goal was to give other
financial institutions an assurance of their financial soundness to help
reinvigorate the financial system and get inter-bank lending flowing again.
Secretary Paulson claimed that this was an emergency.8 After about a week
of debate, TARP passed through Congress in early October 2008.9 In
retrospect, it seems that it was not necessary because the TARP money was
not used for that purpose.
Secretary Paulson requested $700 billion to buy those toxic assets, but
that is not what happened to the money. The Treasury had trouble finding
ways to buy those toxic assets, and later decided on another plan: buying
equity interest in banks. Secretary Paulson’s idea was to purchase preferred
stocks so that the Federal Government would be a significant stockholder in
U.S. banks. Instead of using the money to buy toxic assets like Secretary
Paulson had proposed and Congress had approved, the money for TARP was
used to partially nationalize the United States banking system.10
Secretary Paulson called a summit of the CEOs of the nine largest banks
in the United States to inform them that the government was going to buy
equity interest in their banks, and become a partial owner of those banks.
Many CEOs objected, but Secretary Paulson forced them to take the federal
money and have the Federal Government partially nationalize their banks by
claiming he did not want some banks opting out of the program while others
were in, which would identify certain banks as weak banks. As a result,
every bank had to participate in the program, completing a forced
nationalization of the American banking system.11
After that, the strings attached to this money became apparent.
Congress began looking at the executive compensation of these banks and
decided that some of the executives were earning too much money
considering that the government had just poured $700 billion into their
banks.12 It did not matter that some of the banks originally objected to
receiving the money. After seeing the degree of oversight and control that
Congress wanted to exercise over them, the banks wanted to get out of the
program.13
By this time, President Obama had been elected and Timothy Geithner
had replaced Paulson as the new Secretary of the Treasury, reinforcing the
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bipartisan nature of the plan.14 When the banks asked to buy back the stock
held by the government, Geithner decided not to sell the stock back to them
just yet. He instituted stress tests that banks had to pass and introduced
certain other measures, which essentially prevented the banks from buying
back the preferred stock. In other words, he enforced federal ownership of
the banks.15
One has to wonder what would have happened if Secretary Paulson had
initially gone to Congress and proposed a partial nationalization of the
banking system rather TARP. Nevertheless, that is what the money was used
for, once again initiating a system where the profit and loss aspect that
underlies a market economy was undermined. The problem with a system
like this is obvious. When the government allows firms to keep the profits,
but bails them out in the event that they post a loss, it upsets the profit and
loss balance. Firms should be entrepreneurial. They should take prudent
risks because that is where economic progress comes from. However, on the
other side, firms should be cognizant of the fact that the cost of bad
decisions falls on them. Thus, bailouts remove the loss side of that equation,
which ultimately will encourage excessive risky behavior on the part of
executives.
IV. THE STIMULUS PACKAGE
Exacerbating the situation is the Obama stimulus package, which was
about $800 billion. President Obama sought to pass the stimulus package
immediately after he took office in order to prop up the failing economy and
keep it from sliding further.16 However, very little of the stimulus bill was
actually oriented toward economic stimulus because much of it was spent
toward fulfilling President Obama’s campaign promises. A sizable amount
of that stimulus money was not spent right away, and in fact, there is still
more that has yet to be spent out of that $800 billion.
The irony of this is that the consensus among economists is that the
economy is recovering, and yet that stimulus money is still coming into the
economy.17 President Obama’s argument was that without the stimulus bill,
unemployment would rise above 9%.18 Currently, the unemployment rate is
about 9.7%, so by President Obama’s own metric—which may be unfair to
the president, since perhaps he underestimated the severity of the
recession—the economy is in worse shape now than he forecasted it would
have been without the stimulus bill.19
The underlying logic behind this kind of stimulus spending is basic
Keynesian economic policy. During his administration, one of the things
that President Bush did twice to stimulate the economy was lowering income
taxes. Not only did he lower the rates to give larger refunds on tax day and
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ensure that citizens would not be paying as much next year, but he sent out
checks in the mail to people to stimulate the economy.20
According to the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, budget deficits tend to
stimulate the economy. Keynes maintains that cutting taxes and increasing
government spending provides a fiscal stimulus to the economy. Thus,
increased government spending can prop up overall spending.21 Keynes also
proposed doing this without raising taxes because if taxes increase, that
takes money out of the hands of the spenders in the economy. Therefore, by
running a budget deficit, the economy is stimulated.
When President Bush was elected, the federal budget was in surplus,
and for eight years during the Bush Administration, Bush cut taxes and
increased government spending, thus increasing budget deficits. If budget
deficits really stimulated the economy, by the end of the Bush
Administration the United States would have been in nirvana rather than in
the worst recession since the Great Depression.22
The problem is that the analysis looks at the amount of money being put
into the economy, but does not look at where that money is coming from. If
the government is spending more money, that money has to come from
somewhere. Under this system, consumers are squeezed and investors are
crowded out through government borrowing. Thus, Keynesian economics
shows the increase in government spending, but not the crowding out that
occurs in the private sector. This is another policy that undermines the
workings of the market economy.
V. THE BAILOUTS
Another important issue is the bailouts, which are reflected in the
bailouts of the banks and the financial firms. The bailouts go further than
that, of course, as the government has already bailed out General Motors
(GM) and Chrysler. Again, the bipartisan nature of the policy should be
emphasized. The bailouts for the auto firms started in the Bush
Administration, and were initiated by President Bush himself. If you go
back to last fall, the auto companies were saying, “We are running out of
money. We are going to have to declare bankruptcy if we do not get an
infusion of cash from the Federal Government.” They were begging for a
bailout from the Federal Government. One place where automobile industry
thought they could get some money was from the TARP program. Secretary
Paulson said, “No, TARP money is earmarked for buying toxic assets from
financial institutions. That money is not intended to bailout the auto
industry.” The issue went to Congress and Congress debated it. Ultimately,
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they voted to deny a bailout for the auto industry. Last December, Secretary
Paulson changed his mind on the TARP issue. He gave tens of billions of
dollars to the auto industry to bail them out from the TARP program. TARP
money was used to bail out General Motors and Chrysler, to keep them
afloat and avoid bankruptcy. It was only a few months later that the Obama
Administration gave them more money. In hindsight, this was not a good
idea. In June, GM and Chrysler declared bankruptcy anyway. If automakers
had gone into bankruptcy in December 2008, it would have been a private
affair. Instead of bankruptcy, the auto industry was propped up twice, once
in the Bush Administration and once in the Obama Administration, but they
eventually declared bankruptcy in June. By that time, the Federal
Government had a lot of money invested in those companies. As a result,
the government took a significant minority ownership interest in Chrysler,
and a 61% ownership interest in GM. This is a nationalized auto company.
The Canadian government and the United Auto Workers also own a share of
GM, but the stockholders were wiped out. In addition, the bondholders
ended up with 10% of the company converted into stock.
The issue of whether it is a good idea to nationalize our auto
manufactures can be debated, but it seems that the United States would have
been better off keeping GM in the private sector. The country would have
been better off letting them declare bankruptcy in December with no federal
money, rather than turning them into a nationalized auto company as we did
when they declared bankruptcy in June. Once again, that fundamental profit
and loss foundation of the market economy is being undermined. Maybe
GM and Chrysler could have emerged from bankruptcy. Perhaps they could
have reorganized and come out of bankruptcy like Delta Airlines. Delta
Airlines reorganized during bankruptcy, and now Delta Airlines is the
largest air carrier in the United States. It is possible for a company to
emerge from bankruptcy if they have a viable business model.
If GM and Chrysler were not able to reorganize successfully, then
valuable assets could have been purchased by other firms because if a firm
has assets with any value, those assets do not just disappear when the firm
declares bankruptcy. If GM had factories and assembly lines and were
making valuable cars, somebody else would have wanted to purchase them,
and although GM might have been liquidated for less than GM would like,
the assets would still be there if they were worth anything.
Another side effect of federal intervention is that the bondholders ended
up getting a bad deal. The bondholders were holding secured debt. The
whole idea of secured debt is that in the case of bankruptcy, you get first
claim to the assets of the bankrupt firm. That did not happen because
President Obama wanted to push through another package and many of the
bondholders were willing to go along with it. The major bondholders in GM
at the time were JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, and
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Goldman Sachs.23 They were okay with the Obama plan because they had
taken federal money already, and therefore could not really complain when
the value of their bonds eroded.
The problem is that this undermines the value of secured debt in general
because firms want to issue bonds. Usually when a firm issues bonds, they
are telling bondholders that, “In the event of a problem with this firm, if we
declare bankruptcy, you have first claim on our assets.” This is no longer
the case anymore because the Federal Government took a huge share and
left the secured bondholders with very little. Again, there was not too much
complaining about it because the people who owned many of the bonds were
people who were already beholden to the Federal Government because of
the TARP program. This is another example of the negative effects of the
TARP program.
When President Obama announced his plan, he complained about some
of the bondholders who did not like the settlement, and who thought that
they deserved more because they were secured debt-holders. On April 30,
2009, President Obama was trying to push through his plan for bankruptcy
for GM and said, “While many stakeholders made sacrifices and worked
constructively, I have to tell you, some did not. In particular, a group of
investment firms and hedge funds decided to hold out for the prospect of an
unjustified taxpayer-funded bailout. They were hoping that everybody else
would make sacrifices, and they would have to make none.”24 Again, most
did not complain because they were already beholden to the Federal
Government because of TARP. One person who did speak out was a hedge
fund manager named Cliff Asness. On May 5th, he responded to President
Obama and said, “Let’s be clear, it is the job and obligation of all investment
managers, including hedge fund managers, to get their clients the most
return they can. They are allowed to be charitable with their own money,
and many are spectacularly so, but if they give away their clients’ money to
share in the ‘sacrifice,’ they are stealing.”25
While President Obama is claiming that the hedge funds are asking for a
bailout, in fact, it was only because hedge funds have not taken government
funds that they could stand up to this bullying. The TARP recipients had no
choice, but to go along. The President’s plan takes money from bondholders
and gives it to a labor union that delivers money and votes for him.
VI. CONCLUSION
By bailing out bankrupt firms, we are undermining that profit and loss
mechanism that stands at the foundation of our capitalist economy. That
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profit and loss mechanism has resulted in the remarkable economic progress
that we have seen take place over the last 250 years. The American
economic system may be fragile. It has only been in place for a little more
than a couple of centuries. It seems like a long time, but in the course of
human events, it is not long. Now, we are cutting the legs out from under
the incentives that are at the foundation of American capitalism.
Look at what has happened since the beginning of the financial crisis.
Again, the bipartisan nature of this should be emphasized. The TARP
program was initiated in the Bush Administration. Ben Bernanke, the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve was appointed by President Bush. Many
of the policies discussed were initiated under the Bush Administration.
Therefore, this is not a critique only on the current Administration or on
President Obama. This is something that goes back to the Bush
Administration and has been a bipartisan effort.
In response to the financial crisis, we are nationalizing our banking and
financial industry, we are nationalizing the automobile industry, and the
Federal Government owns 80% of AIG and 61% of GM. Currently, an
important policy issue is the healthcare debate. We are thinking about
having the Federal Government play a much larger role in the healthcare
system that it already dominates. In energy policy, we are talking about the
Federal Government playing a much larger role in our energy markets. We
are really looking at a fundamental transformation here in the nature of
American capitalism.
Many who have been around long enough, have had a pessimistic
feeling about our economic future before. The 1970s was a decade of
double-digit inflation and rising unemployment. There was an energy crisis
with lines at the gas pump caused by Federal Government price controls on
gasoline. The Iranians were occupying the U.S. embassy. The 1970s was
also the decade that brought in disco music and polyester leisure suits.
There is not much good to be said about the 1970s. Despite that, Americans
managed to turn things around in the 1980s and the 1990s. By 1989, with
the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and in 1991 with the demise of the Soviet
Union, it would appear that the virtues of the market economy over
government planning would have looked so large that there would be no
turning back. Over the twentieth century, in the struggle between socialism
and capitalism, the strength of the capitalist economy won. With the
collapse of those centrally planned economies, everybody said, “We now
see, capitalism is the right way to go. Market allocation of resources is
better than government planning.” It is interesting that so much of the
current debate turns on how much more involved we want the government to
be in our economy.
To conclude, there is a message of hope and change. Hopefully, the
gloomy outlook of the Obama policy does not come to fruition. The hope is
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that with a little distance, we will be able to look back and see that we had a
little too much intervention and that the market economy really works quite
well. Hopefully, there may be some lessons that we can learn from this that
will strengthen the market economy.
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